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I. Introduction
The time is ripe to explore ways we might recognize new forms of
intimate associations. The United States Supreme Court has just made
same-sex marriage available and legally recognized in every state. 1 The
relationship world has changed. 2 Cohabitation has become widely
accepted. 3 Sixty-eight percent of all intimate unions for women surveyed
between 1997 and 2001 began as cohabitation. 4 Of those intimate unions
that led to marriage, ninety-six percent of women and ninety-three percent
of men in the marriages lived with their first spouse before marrying that
person. 5
The headline of a recent Time magazine asked “Is Monogamy Over?” 6
News agencies across the globe spent several weeks reporting about the
data breach of Ashley Madison, the infamous dating website for married

1. See Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2604–08 (2015) (holding that the right
to marry is a fundamental right and that couples of the same sex cannot be deprived of that
right and liberty).
2. See CASEY E. COPEN, KIMBERLY DANIELS, JONATHAN VESPA & WILLIAM D.
MOSHER, 49 NATIONAL HEALTH STATISTICS REPORT 1 (2012) (describing how marriages
were more delayed than in the past with cohabitation contributing to the delay).
3. See id. at 2 (showing trends and group differences in current marital status).
4. See id. (explaining that cohabitation has increasingly become the first coresidential union formed among young adults in the United States).
5. See id. at 8 (stating that about fifty-seven percent of ever-married women and sixty
percent of ever-married men cohabitated prior to first marriage).
6. See TIME, Is Monogamy Over?, Sept. 21, 2015 (providing different arguments for
and against monogamy and the nuclear family model).
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people. 7 The release and popularity of Fifty Shades of Grey, as a series of
three books and then as a movie, have allowed discussion of BDSM
practices to become more commonplace. 8 All of these events are indicators
that society’s views about marriage and intimate relationships are
expanding.
Marriage and intimate relationships are evolving but the law still
restricts people from choosing to build fulfilling relationships. Marriage is
restricted to two adults. 9 Those who choose to create intimate associations
without the legal benefit of marriage are potentially violating criminal
statutes regarding fornication 10 or cohabitation. 11 Married individuals who
develop intimate relationships with someone other than their spouse violate
adultery statutes. 12 And those who attempt to marry someone when they
7. See Danny Yadron, Hackers Target Users of Infidelity Website Ashley Madison:
Cyberattack Could Expose Millions of Users’ Personal Information, WALL ST. J., (July 20,
2015, 7:43 PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/affairwebsiteashleymadisonhacked1437
402152 (describing how an intruder threatened to release real names and personal
preferences of site’s millions of users unless it was shut down).
8. See generally E.L. JAMES, FIFTY SHADES FREED (2012); E.L. JAMES, FIFTY SHADES
DARKER (2012); E.L. JAMES, FIFTY SHADES OF GREY (2011); FIFTY SHADES OF GREY
(Universal Pictures 2015).
9. See Elizabeth F. Emens, Monogamy’s Law: Compulsory Monogamy and
Polyamorous Existence, 29 N.Y. U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 277, 361 (2004) (stating that
marriage laws in all fifty states prevent multiple parties from marrying one another).
10. Seven states continue to carry criminal prohibitions against fornication in their
criminal codes. See, e.g., IDAHO CODE ANN. §18-6603 (West 2015)
Any unmarried person who shall have sexual intercourse with an unmarried
person of the opposite sex shall be deemed guilty of fornication, and, upon
conviction thereof, shall be punished by a fine of not more than $300 or by
imprisonment for not more than six months or by both such fine and
imprisonment; provided, that the sentence imposed or any part thereof may be
suspended with or without probation in the discretion of the court.
720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/11-40 (West 2015); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. Ch. 272 § 18
(West 2015); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609.34 (West 2015); MISS. CODE. ANN. § 97-29-1 (West
2015); S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-15-60 (2015); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-7-104 (West 2015).
11. See MICH. COMP. LAWS. ANN. § 750.335 (West 2015); MISS. CODE ANN. § 97-29-1
(West 2015).
12. Twenty-two U.S. jurisdictions carry adultery prohibitions in their criminal codes:
ALA. CODE § 13A-13-2 (West 2015); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-1408 (2015); FLA. STAT.
ANN. § 798.01 (West 2015); GA. CODE ANN. § 16-6-19 (West 2015); IDAHO CODE ANN.
§ 18-6601 (West 2015); 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/11-35 (West 2015.); KAN. STAT. ANN.
§ 21-5511 (West 2015); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 272 § 14 (West 2015); MD. CODE ANN.
CRIM. LAW §10-501 (West 2015); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 750.31 (West 2015); MINN.
STAT. ANN. § 609.36 (West 2015); MISS. CODE ANN. § 97-29-1 (West 2015); N.Y. PENAL
LAW § 255.17 (McKinney 2015); N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. § 12.1-20-09 (West 2015); OKLA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 21 § 871 (West 2015); R.I. GEN LAWS ANN. § 11-6-2 (West 2015); S.C. CODE
ANN. § 16-15-60 (2015); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-7-103 (West 2015); VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-
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already have a spouse are guilty of bigamy and may face serious criminal
penalties. 13 The effect of these restrictions is to force everyone to create
dyadic pairings as intimate associations, and to expect sexual exclusivity
once that dyad is created. 14 These legal restrictions regarding sexual
interactions and intimate relationships no longer reflect the practices and
behaviors that are prevalent in today’s society. 15 Continuing to allow the
legal restrictions to exist, even if they have fallen into desuetude, leaves a
lingering cloud over those who make choices other than traditional
marriage, 16 and prevent those who might choose other options from being
able to do so with full disclosure and consent. 17 Even the lawmakers are
aware that the laws are antiquated and rarely enforced.18 For example,
commentary associated with Alabama’s criminal statute addressing adultery
states:
While there is strong sentiment that adultery should not be regulated by
criminal sanction, the committee was of the opinion that the political
success of a proposal formally to abolish this crime would, at the present
time, be doubtful.
The number of liaisons which are illegal under Alabama law is,
undoubtedly, very high. On the other hand, arrests and prosecutions are
rare. This belief is consistent with studies conducted elsewhere.
The conclusion is clear that existing criminal law has been notoriously
unsuccessful in stamping out adultery, and it is unlikely that anyone will
ever launch a program of enforcement on a scale sufficient to make
criminal penalties a significant risk in philandery. It also follows that the
reluctance of public officials to enforce the law is resulting in an
informal abolition of any criminal stigma. While sympathizing with the
365 (West2015); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 944.16 (West 2015).
13. See, e.g., W. VA. CODE ANN. § 61-8-1 (West 1923)
Any person, being married, who, during the life of the former husband or wife,
shall marry another person in this State, or, if the marriage with such other
person take place out of this State, shall thereafter cohabit with such other
person in this State, shall be guilty of a felony, and, upon conviction, shall be
confined in the penitentiary not less than one nor more than five years.
14. See Emens, supra note 9, at 308 (“In the legal realm, adultery statutes target
violations of the exclusivity norm.”).
15. See id. at 281 (questioning why the two-people requirement of marriage is so
widely accepted when many practice adultery or serial divorce and remarriage).
16. See id. at 364 (explaining how legal restrictions stand as emblems of the
expectations of monogamy).
17. See id. at 368 (stating that consent could be understood as a feature of the
relationship).
18. See id. at 364 (mentioning how adultery laws are rarely enforced).
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argument that continuation of a “dead letter” statute may tend to bring
the criminal law into disrespect, the committee felt that formal
repudiation of the adultery offense was premature. Moreover, it may
prove useful on occasions, as for example in plea bargaining. 19

Recent debate about same-sex marriage has caused people to identify
characteristics that make marriage special. 20 Writing for the majority in the
Supreme Court’s latest assessment of marriage, Justice Kennedy described
it thusly: “No union is more profound than marriage, for it embodies the
highest ideals of love, fidelity, devotion, sacrifice, and family. In becoming
a marital union, two people become something greater than they once
were . . . . [M]arriage embodies a love that may endure even past death.”21 I
argue that marriage, and all intimate relationships, are very important—to
our emotional and spiritual well-being. Many non-marital intimate
relationships embody the same ideals. But all of these, whether formally
recognized as a legal marriage or established informally without benefit of
government recognition, are also unique, and we should all have the
freedom to create a marriage or build intimate relationships with others in
ways that allow for maximum fulfillment. This requires removing or
modifying some of the current restrictions around intimate relationships and
behaviors.
My goal is not to question the constitutionality of restrictions on
marriage and intimate relationships. Fighting that battle requires an unusual
combination of events, parties, and legal issues, which may eventually
cause incremental changes in the manner specific relationships are
configured or recognized. Instead, I want to demonstrate how we can
legislatively change the limitations imposed on marital and other intimate
relationships so those who seek alternatives to the traditional arrangements
can do so without the threat of criminal action, and with clear
understandings about the nature of the relationships they choose to enter. 22
My hypothesis is that expanding the ways we can come together to form
intimate relationships will lead to stronger family bonds, fewer divorces,
and more tolerance of lifestyles that are now considered “alternative.” 23
19. ALA. CODE § 13A-13-2 Commentary (1975).
20. See generally Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015).
21. Id. at 2608.
22. See infra Part VIII (proposing a new legislative approach in today’s changed
world).
23. See Emens, supra note 9, at 278 ( “One reason monogamy is so important to us is
that we are so terrorized by what we imagine are the alternatives to it.”) (quoting ADAM
PHILLIPS, MONOGAMY 98 (1996)).
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What I am suggesting is an acknowledgment of the various ways
people form intimate relationships today, without the secrecy, and with
openness about choices that will protect parties from the harm that the
current climate of secrecy and illicit behavior causes. 24 I propose that we
allow intimate partners to choose the form of the relationship, with full
disclosure and consent of those involved. 25 Many people will continue to
choose traditional monogamy, in the form of marriage, whether
heterosexual or homosexual. 26 Traditional marriage implies sexual
exclusivity and emotional bonds to only one person. 27 Some couples may
agree to the same sort of arrangement, including the exclusivity regarding
sexual interactions and emotional bonding, without formally entering into a
marriage. For the purposes of this Article, I see no critical distinction
between these arrangements and will refer to these interchangeably as
traditional marriage or traditional monogamy, despite the fact that the latter
option is technically not marriage. Others may choose something that looks
slightly different, and these different arrangements are where we can allow
room for individual variety by eliminating some of the existing prohibitions
related to intimate relationships, and expanding the legally recognized
forms of marriage. 28
Once a couple is married, the parameters of their relationship are left
for them to determine. 29 Courts have been loath to interfere, and have only
inserted themselves into the relationship at the beginning and end of
marriages. 30 Yet, even so, the legislatures of many states do insert
themselves in these relationships, albeit indirectly, by criminalizing extramarital sex. 31 Eliminating these prohibitions, and those that prohibit other
forms of non-marital sex between consenting adults, would allow each of us
to negotiate the boundaries of our intimate relationships to maximize our

24. See infra Part II.B. (discussing the consequences of unenforced criminal law).
25. Infra Part VIII.B.
26. Infra Part VIII.
27. See Boddie v. Conn., 401 U.S. 371, 383 (1971) (“[Marriage] is a fundamental
human relationship.”).
28. See infra Part VII (explaining that permanent monogamy is no longer the expected
norm).
29. See infra Part VIII (providing an example of a relationship contract).
30. See Adrienne D. Davis, Regulating Polygamy: Intimacy, Default Rules, and
Bargaining for Equality, 110 COLUM. L. REV. 1955, 1993 (2010) (stating that family law has
little to say in between the marriage formation and dissolution licensing structure).
31. See infra Part III (explaining why politicians are reluctant to repeal these criminal
statutes).
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happiness and individualize the relationship to best suit the needs of those
involved.
An alternative to traditional monogamy would allow individuals in
committed, intimate relationships to choose, together, to allow consensual
non-monogamy, or what some call ethical non-monogamy. 32 Those familiar
with these terms may immediately think of polyamory. 33 Those less
familiar may think of polygamy. 34 Though our legal history has strongly
disfavored polygamy for some legitimate reasons, I suggest that the option
of ethical non-monogamy be included in the realm of possibilities. 35 As
Part V points out, there are logistical concerns with polyamory and
polygamy that suggest now may not be the time to formally recognize these
forms of relationships, but the prohibitions can be eliminated, as a first step,
and as a way to provide committed intimate partners the ability to establish
the parameters of their relationship as they see fit. Eliminating prohibitions
on extra-marital sex or non-marital sex allows for open relationships, a
form of ethical non-monogamy. Open relationships differ slightly from
polyamory, mostly in the level of involvement between all those involved
in the relationship, and sometimes in the level of commitment to the
relationships outside of the original. 36
All of these potential relationship choices involve similar
characteristics. All require those involved to be very self-aware—to
understand what they are doing and why they are making that choice.
Because relationships involve more than one person, these alternative forms
also require well-developed communication skills, radical honesty, and a
great deal of trust among those participating in the relationship.37
It is likely that many people are engaging in behaviors that look a great
deal like polyamory or open relationships, but they are doing so in secret,
without honest communication and trust. This eventually leads to emotional
harm and, at times, the end of a committed relationship. If, instead, people

32. See infra Part VIII (discussing ethical non-monogamy as a marriage couple able to
freely develop sex intimacies with others).
33. See infra Part V (discussing plural marriages).
34. Id.
35. Infra Part VIII.
36. See Maura I. Strassberg, The Challenge of Post-Modern Polygamy: Considering
Polyamory, 31 CAP. U. L. REV. 439, 444 (2003) (evaluating the political consequences of
polyamory relationships).
37. See id. at 456–57 (describing the need for openness and consent in multi-partner
relationships); see also Emens, supra note 9, at 283 (discussing the societal and legal
implications of polyamorous relationships).
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engaged in these behaviors with the full knowledge and consent of their
partners, one might predict that fewer innocent spouses would be hurt,
fewer marriages would end in divorce, and fewer families would be
fractured into smaller units. In many situations, families would grow to
look more like the extended families of the past, where multiple adults were
involved in supporting each other and the children in the family. Hillary
Clinton made famous the proverb “it takes a village to raise a child.” 38 Our
current restrictions on the forms and expectations of intimate relationships
make that village less likely to form, and once formed, less likely to be a
stable influence. Expanding the options of relationship forms to include
consensual non-monogamy can enhance the village effect by allowing
parents to include additional intimate partners in the family that is available
for parenting.
Following this Introduction, Part II of this Article looks at the way
marriage and intimate relationships have been regulated in recent times,
including the areas of these relationships that have been protected from
legal regulation. Part III will identify the ways behavior that might be
consensual and non-monogamous is currently discouraged. Laws governing
intimate relationships have existed since the founding of our country. 39 At
the time they were enacted there may have been legitimate reasons for
creating them. 40 But given the changes in society, especially regarding
women’s rights, divorce, child support, and the acceptance of single
parenting, these laws now serve only to discourage behaviors that
consenting adults might find beneficial. 41 Part III examines the way these
laws prevent intimate partners from engaging in behaviors that each finds
acceptable, even though the actual enforcement of the law may have fallen
into desuetude.
Part IV tackles the sensitive subject of consent and sexual assault
crimes. Here, the article examines the role of BDSM practices in some
intimate relationships and the potential criminal sanctions for these
38. Though this saying was incorporated into the title of a book by Hillary Rodham
Clinton, and another by Jane Cowan-Fletcher, its exact origin is unknown. HILLARY
RODHAM CLINTON, IT TAKES A VILLAGE: AND OTHER LESSONS CHILDREN TEACH US (1996);
JANE COWAN-FLETCHER, IT TAKES A VILLAGE (1999).
39. See JoAnne Sweeny, Undead Statutes: The Rise, Fall, and Continuing Uses of
Adultery and Fornication Criminal Laws, 46 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 127, 134 (2014) (explaining
the history of laws governing intimate relationships).
40. Id. at 133.
41. See Alicia Brokars Kelly, Navigating Gender in Modern Intimate Partnership
Law, 14 J. L. & FAM. STUD. 1, 35–41 (2012) (discussing problems with gender roles in the
law in our modern era).
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activities. This Part looks at the element of consent in BDSM practices and
suggests that evidence of consent be allowed as a potential defense to
sexual assault charges. Admittedly, this is a sensitive topic, yet as the
American Law Institute is currently revising the Model Penal Code sections
involving sex offenses, 42 now is the time to make these suggestions.
Part V briefly addresses the idea of plural marriage. Though this
Article does not advocate for recognition of such arrangements, this Part
identifies many of the reasons for at least eliminating the restriction against
plural marriage. At the same time, as further explained in Part V, the
complications involved in regulating and recognizing plural marriages
differ from the other alternative arrangements discussed here, and are
therefore beyond the scope of this Article. Still, the time is quickly
approaching to tackle these concerns.
Part VI looks at efforts to legislate moral behavior and the change in
acceptance of the use of morality as the sole reason for legislation. Part VII
focuses on the importance of consent in all aspects of intimate relationships
and non-criminal sexual interactions. Finally, Part VIII concludes by
suggesting new options for intimate relationship structures and how such
new structures that allow consensual non-monogamy can benefit the
individuals involved, and potentially strengthen long-term relationships
rather than harming them.
II. The Regulation and Protection of Marriage
A. Marriage as a Fundamental Right
The United States Supreme Court has repeatedly recognized marriage
as a fundamental right. Support for this conclusion has been based on rights
to liberty, privacy, association, and identity. 43 The Court first acknowledged
42. See MODEL PENAL CODE, Sexual Assault and Related Offenses, Discussion Draft
No. 2 (April 28, 2015), https://www.ali.org/projects/show/sexual-assault-and-relatedoffenses/ (reexamining the the Model Penal Code’s approach to sex offenses) (on file with
author).
43. See, e.g., Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 390 (1923) (“[Liberty] denotes not
merely freedom from bodily restraint but also the right of the individual to contract, to
engage in any of the common occupations of life, to acquire useful knowledge, to marry,
establish a home and bring up children.”); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 486
(1965) (“[Marriage] is an association that promotes a way of life, not causes; a harmony in
living, not political faiths; a bilateral loyalty, not commercial or social projects. Yet it is an
association for as noble a purpose as any involved in our prior decisions.”); Planned
Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 851 (1992) (“At the heart of liberty is the right
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the importance of marriage while declaring the power of the legislature to
control it. 44 Though marriage “creat[es] the most important relation in life”
and has “more to do with the morals and civilization of a people than any
other institution” the legislature still has authority to regulate aspects of the
marriage. 45 The legislature can “prescribe the age at which parties may
contract to marry, the procedure or form essential to constitute marriage,
the duties and obligations it creates, its effect upon the property rights of
both, present and prospective, and the acts which may constitute grounds
for its dissolution.” 46
While attempting to identify the parameters of the liberty guaranteed
by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, the Court
explained that liberty protected by the Due Process Clause involved “not
merely freedom from bodily restraint, but also the rights of the individual to
contract, to engage in any of the common occupations of life, to acquire
useful knowledge, [and] to marry . . . .” 47
When declaring racial restrictions limiting who could marry
unconstitutional, the Court described marriage as “one of the ‘basic civil
rights of man,’ fundamental to our very existence and survival” and noted
“[t]he freedom to marry has long been recognized as one of the vital
personal rights essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness by free men.” 48
Later, addressing the due process right of indigent parties to access the
court system to dissolve the marriage, the Court described marriage as
“involv[ing] interests of basic importance to our society” and a
“fundamental human relationship.” 49 Later cases continued to include
marriage as a fundamental right, protected against unwarranted state
intrusion. 50
to define one’s own concept of existence, of meaning, of the universe, and of the mystery of
human life.”).
44. See Maynard v. Hill, 125 U.S. 190, 205–06 (1888) (deciding that a legislature has
the authority to create laws governing divorce).
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. Meyer, 262 U.S. at 399.
48. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967).
49. Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 376, 383 (1971).
50. See Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632, 639–40 (1974) (“This Court
has long recognized that freedom of personal choice in matters of marriage and family life is
one of the liberties protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.”);
Moore v. City of E. Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 499 (1977) (plurality) (“[W]hen the
government intrudes on choices concerning family living arrangements, this Court must
examine carefully the importance of the governmental interests advanced and the extent to
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B. Rights to Intimate Relationships Today
1. Same-Sex Marriage
In the most recent Supreme Court pronouncement regarding marriage,
Obergefell v. Hodges, 51 Justice Kennedy, writing for the majority described
the liberty interest protected by the Constitution as one that “includes
certain specific rights that allow persons, within a lawful realm, to define
and express their identity.” 52 Continuing to review the history of marriage
in the United States, Justice Kennedy pointed out some of the significant
changes in that institution over time, including the fact that marriages are
no longer arranged for political, religious, or financial concerns (though
there may still be marriages that are based on these interests, most people
enter a marriage for emotional reasons), and concepts such as coverture,
where the couple is treated as a “single, male-dominated entity” no longer
exist. 53
Writing for the majority of the Court, Justice Kennedy identified
attributes of marriage that have been identified as essential by Supreme
Court precedents. These include the idea that personal choice about
marriage is part of an individual’s right to autonomy, and is “among the
most intimate [decisions] that an individual can make.” 54 Additionally,
marriage is about commitment to another, 55 and protects individual’s rights
which they are served by the challenged regulation.”); Carey v. Population Services Int’l,
431 U.S. 678, 684–85 (1977) (“[I]t is clear that among the decisions that an individual may
make without unjustified government interference are personal decisions relating to
marriage, procreation, contraception, family relationships, and child rearing and
education.”); Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 384 (1978) (“[T]he right to marry is of
fundamental importance for all individuals.”); Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 95 (1987)
(“[T]he decision to marry is a fundamental right” and an “expression of emotional support
and public commitment.”); Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 851
(1992) (“These matters, involving the most intimate and personal choices a person may
make in a lifetime, choices central to personal dignity and autonomy, are central to the
liberty protected by the Fourteenth Amendment.”); M.L.B. v. S.L.J., 519 U.S. 102, 116
(1996) (“Choices about marriage, family life, and the upbringing of children are among
associational rights this Court has ranked as ‘of basic importance in our society,’ rights
sheltered by the Fourteenth Amendment against the State’s unwarranted usurpation,
disregard, or disrespect.”).
51. See Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2608 (2015) (concluding that same-sex
couples may not be denied the fundamental right of marriage).
52. Id. at 2593.
53. Id. at 2595.
54. Id. at 2599.
55. Id.
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to determine whether to procreate and how to raise children should they be
a result of the marriage. 56 Finally, marriage allows access to societal
support as well as responsibility towards society. These rights and
responsibilities involve tax, inheritance and property rights; evidentiary
privilege to avoid testifying against a spouse; hospital access and rights to
make medical decisions on behalf of a spouse; adoption rights; survivor’s
benefits; recognition on birth and death records; worker’s compensation
benefits; health insurance benefits; and child custody, support, and
visitation rights. 57 Spouses are also limited by some professional ethics
rules and by campaign finance restrictions. 58
All of the characteristics, rights, and responsibilities related to
marriage involve how parties to the marriage interact with the rest of
society. Decisions that are personal, between those were party to the
marriage, are protected from state intrusion. Once recognized by the state,
the details of the arrangement between the parties to the marriage are
private and individual or couple determined. The Obergefell majority
recognized the decisions about marriage, and its individual parameters, are
based on “many personal, romantic, and practical considerations . . . ” 59 and
that these decisions, even to marry someone of the same sex, involve “only
the rights of two consenting adults whose marriages would pose no risk of
harm to themselves or third parties.” 60
2. Expanding Intimate Relationship Rights
As the Obergefell court expanded the right to marry to same-sex
couples, it relied on an earlier decision related to intimate relationships,
Lawrence v. Texas, 61 to acknowledge that individuals have the right to
engage in private sexual conduct without fear of criminal sanctions. 62

56. Id. at 2601.
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. Id. at 2607.
60. Id.
61. See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578–79 (2003) (explaining that
constitutional protections allow individuals to engage in their own private sexual conduct
without government interference).
62. Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2604 (2015) (citing Lawrence, 539 U.S. at
578).
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According to Lawrence v. Texas, the liberty protected by the Due
Process Clause “presumes an autonomy of self that includes freedom of
thought, belief, expression, and certain intimate conduct.” 63 Consequently,
consenting adults are free to engage in sexual conduct of their choosing
without state interference. According to the Lawrence court, decisions
“concerning the intimacies of [married persons’] physical relationship . . .
are a form of “liberty” protected by the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment. Moreover, this protection extends to intimate
choices by unmarried as well as married persons.” 64
As the next Part describes, if adults truly have a protected right to
engage in consensual sexual conduct without interference from the state,
then the application of certain criminal statutes violates these rights.
Currently, in some states, cohabiting is a crime. 65 Twenty-one states still
have statutes criminalizing adultery, 66 and, in all states, certain forms of
BDSM sexual activity are sex crimes with no potential to raise consent as a
defense. 67 For those who practice alternative lifestyles, such as BDSM,
those who are involved in open relationships and polyamorous
relationships, and those who engage in consensual swinging, the existence
of these criminal statutes, and especially the application of assault criminal
statutes, restricts their right to engage in consensual sexual conduct without
interference from the state.
III. Criminalizing and Discouraging Consensual Choices Regarding
Intimate Sexual Behavior
This Part addresses the crimes of adultery, fornication, and
cohabitation. Though criminal sanctions related to BDSM activities create
the same type of impediment to free choices about consensual sexual
intimacy, the criminalization of those activities is more complicated, and
deserves an analysis all its own. This will happen in Part IV.
63. Lawrence , 539 U.S. at 562.
64. Id. at 578 (quoting Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 216 (1986) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting)).
65. See Emens, supra note 9 (discussing the societal and legal reaction to polyamorous
relationships).
66. See Deborah L. Rhode, Adultery: An Agenda for Legal Reform, 11 STAN. J. C.R. &
C.L. 179, 180 (2015) (examining the constitutional issues with criminal prosecutions for
adultery in the United States).
67. See Margo Kaplan, Sex-Positive Law, 89 N.Y.U. L. REV. 89, 118–22 (2014)
(analyzing how law and legal discourse undervalue the importance of sexual pleasure).
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Despite the fact that cohabitation, either prior to marriage, or as an
alternative to marriage, is well accepted among most members of society,
several states still explicitly prohibit cohabitation. 68 Additionally, eight
states explicitly criminalize fornication (sexual intercourse between people
not married to each other). 69 And, though rarely prosecuted in recent years,
statutes criminalizing adultery still exist in twenty-two jurisdictions. 70
A. Historical Justifications for Criminalizing Intimacy
Originally enacted to enforce Christian morals, 71 these statutes were
enforced rigorously and publicly in the 1600s and 1700s. 72 Prosecution for
fornication and adultery was used to force fathers of illegitimate children to
provide for the children rather than relying on public assistance. 73
Additionally, both fornication prosecutions and adultery prosecutions were
used to encourage women to remain chaste until marriage, and married
women to remain faithful to their husbands, guaranteeing that any offspring
would belong to the husband rather than some other sexual partner. 74
Early prosecutions for adultery focused on the innocent spouse as the
victim, and in some jurisdictions prosecution required a complaining
spouse, where without a complaint from the wronged spouse, the courts
68. MICH. COMP. LAWS. ANN. § 750.335 (West 2015); MISS. CODE ANN. § 97-29-1
(West 2015).
69. See, e.g., IDAHO CODE ANN. §18-6603 (West 2015) (“Any unmarried person who
shall have sexual intercourse with an unmarried person of the opposite sex shall be deemed
guilty of fornication.”). See also generally 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/11-40 (West, 2015);
MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 272 § 18 (West 2015); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609.34 (West 2015);
MISS. CODE. ANN. § 97-29-1 (West 2015); S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-15-60 (2015); UTAH CODE
ANN. § 76-7-104 (West 2015).
70. ALA. CODE § 13A-13-2 (West 2015); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-1408 (2015);
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 798.01 (West 2015); GA. CODE ANN. § 16-6-19 (West 2015); IDAHO
CODE ANN. § 18-6601 (West 2015); 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/11-35 (West 2015.); KAN.
STAT. ANN. § 21-5511 (West 2015); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 272 § 14 (West 2015); MD.
CODE ANN. Criminal Law §10-501 (West 2015); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 750.31 (West
2015); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609.36 (West 2015); MISS. CODE ANN. § 97-29-1 (West 2015);
N.Y. PENAL LAW § 255.17 (McKinney 2015); N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. § 12.1-20-09 (West
2015); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21 § 871 (West 2015); R.I. GEN LAWS ANN. § 11-6-2 (West
2015); S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-15-60 (2015); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-7-103 (West 2015); VA.
CODE ANN. § 18.2-365 (West2015); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 944.16 (West 2015).
71. Sweeny, supra note 39, at 133.
72. Id. at 134.
73. Id. at 137–38
74. Id. at 139.
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were reluctant to prosecute and increase the humiliation the victim might
suffer. 75 Some criminal statutes today continue to require a complaint from
a wronged spouse in order to prosecute someone for adultery. 76
Fornication, on the other hand, has consistently been viewed as a
crime against “public decency and morality.” 77 Like adultery prosecutions,
fornication prosecutions also allow the states to impose support obligations
for any illegitimate children. 78
In the 1970s and 1980s, as the Supreme Court expanded privacy rights
related to sexual activity, regardless of marital status, 79 prosecutions under
adultery and fornication statutes decreased significantly. 80 Today,
especially in light of the Supreme Court’s decision in Lawrence v. Texas,
adultery, fornication, and cohabitation statutes have become obsolete. In
1955, the American Law Institute removed adultery from the Model Penal
Code and many states decriminalized adultery as well.81 However, many of
these statutes remain on the books because, without prosecution, no one has
standing to challenge the statute. 82 Consequently, though unlikely there
remains the potential for criminal charges to be brought against those who
engage in the socially accepted, yet legally criminal acts.83 Legislators and
politicians feel little pressure to repeal these statutes: the statutes are not
often prosecuted, the statutes reflect a desire to enforce a level of morality,
and repealing the statutes may imply that the legislators condone the
prohibited behaviors. 84
75. Id. at 146–47.
76. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-1408 (2015) (“No prosecution for adultery
shall be commenced except upon complaint of the husband or wife.”).
77. Sweeny, supra note 39, at 147.
78. Id. at 147–48.
79. See Eisenstadt v. Baird, 406 U.S. 438, 453 (1972) (extending the right of privacy
related to childbirth and contraception to single people); Carey v. Population Servs. Int’l,
431 U.S. 678, 694–95 (1977) (extending the right of privacy related to procreation and
contraception to minors).
80. Sweeny, supra note 39, at 149.
81. Martin J. Siegel, For Better or For Worse: Adultery, Crime & the Constitution, 30
J. FAM. L. 45, 49 (1991–1992).
82. Sweeny, supra note 39, at 170–71.
83. Id. at 170.
84. Id. at 173; Siegel, supra note 81, at 49–50. One example of the reason the statutes
still exist is captured in practice commentary provided with New York’s adultery statute:
The Temporary Commission on Revision of the Penal Law and Criminal Code
‘recommended that the offense of adultery (former Penal Law §§ 100–103) be
omitted from the revised Penal Law. A majority of the Commission was of the
opinion that the basic problem is one of private rather than public morals, and

18

22 WASH. & LEE J. CIVIL RTS. & SOC. JUST. 3 (2016)
B. Collateral Consequences of Unenforced Criminal Law

Though the threat of criminal prosecution is remote, the fact that
adultery, fornication, and cohabitation are prohibited can affect other legal
proceedings. Family courts may consider adultery when making alimony
awards. 85 Public servants such as police officers or teachers may lose their
jobs for engaging in criminal activity, 86 and politicians are subjected to
public scandal as a result of indiscretions that are still technically criminal
infractions. 87
C. Evidence of Criminal Behavior Despite the Laws
The recent data breach of the dating site for married people, Ashley
Madison, demonstrates how widespread adultery may be among married
couples. The website, which facilitates extra-marital affairs, and advertises
with a slogan “life is short, have an affair,” claims more than 37 million
members. 88 Though this number is unverified and likely highly
exaggerated, analysis of the 36,397,896 e-mail addresses released by the
hackers found 66%, or 24,039,705 email addresses were valid. 89
Admittedly, the data include e-mail addresses originating in other countries,
and simply registering with the service does not mean that an individual has
that its inclusion in a criminal code neither protects the public nor acts as a
deterrent. It was further noted that proscribing conduct which is almost
universally overlooked by law enforcement agencies tends to weaken the fabric
of the whole penal law. The Legislature, however, rejected the Commission's
recommendation and enacted § 255.17 (L.1965, c. 1037)’ Denzer and
McQuillan, Practice Commentary to Penal Law § 255.17, McKinney's Penal
Law (1967).
William Donnino, Practice Commentary to Penal Law § 255.17 (McKinney 2015).
85. Siegel, supra note 81, at 54.
86. Id.
87. Kathy Kiely & Thomas M. Defrank, President Clinton Admits to Having an
Inappropriate Relationship with Monica Lewinsky in 1998, N.Y DAILY NEWS, August 18,
2015 (originally published by the Daily News on August 18, 1998),
http://www.nydailynews.com/news/politics/clinton-admits-relationship-lewinsky-1998-article1.817191; Tim Padget, Sanford’s Sex Scandal: Assessing the Damage, TIME, June 25, 2009,
http://content.time.com/time/politics/article/0,8599,1907036,00.html.
88. Danny Yadron, Hackers Target Users of Infidelity Website Ashley Madison, WALL
ST. J., July 20, 2015, http://www.wsj.com/articles/affairwebsiteashleymadisonhacked
1437402152.
89. Travis Keith, The Ashley Madison Hack in Seven Charts, COLUMN FIVE, August
24, 2015, http://www.columnfivemedia.com/the-ashley-madison-hack-in-8-charts.
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conducted an extra-marital affair. But, the prevalence of those who were at
least considering an extramarital affair suggests that adultery is alive and
well.
By some accounts, half of all married men have committed adultery,
and up to 40% of married women have done so. 90 Not all marriages end as a
result of extra-marital affairs. Many people report happy marriages despite
the extramarital activity. 91
Approval, or at least acceptance, of premarital and extramarital sex has
increased as contraceptives have become more effective and available. At
the same time attitudes about sex have shifted, and women have become
more independent and less economically reliant on men for support. These
changes in attitude resulted in an increase in the rates and acceptance of
premarital sex and adultery. 92
D. Criminalizing Protected Behaviors
Decisions regarding premarital and extramarital sex seem to be exactly
the types of decisions that are protected by the right of privacy articulated
in Lawrence and Obergefell. If adults have the constitutionally protected
right to engage in sexual conduct of their choosing, without interference
from the state,93 and “personal choices central to individual dignity and
autonomy” 94 include intimate choices, then how can the choice to engage in
premarital or extramarital sex be removed from the set of protected
personal choices? The decision to commit adultery is a decision relating to
marriage and family relationships even if it is a choice that society does not
want to condone. 95 Likewise, the decision to engage in premarital sex is a
decision involving “intimate choices that define personal identity and
beliefs,” 96 and even if others may find this offensive to their religious
beliefs, those religious objections “cannot be law and public policy with the
imprimatur of the state.” 97

90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.

Siegel, supra note 81, at 55.
Id. at 57.
Sweeny, supra note 39, at 148.
Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578–79 (2003).
Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct 2584, 2597–98 (2015).
Siegel, supra note 81, at 71.
Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2597–98.
Id. at 2602.
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If choices regarding premarital sex and extramarital affairs are part of
the fundamental right to privacy, then decisions to cohabit without the
formalities of marriage are also protected choices. Moreover, the choice of
living with a partner falls within an additional protection, the freedom to
associate, a liberty protected by the First Amendment. 98
1. Justifications for Adultery Prohibitions are no Longer Justified
Assuming choices regarding cohabitation, premarital sex, and
extramarital sex are protected under the fundamental right to privacy, the
only reason these choices can be restricted is to protect a compelling state
interest. 99 Martin Siegel presents a thorough analysis of the constitutional
implications surrounding adultery, explaining how adultery falls within
protected fundamental rights and what state interests are offered in support
of continuing to criminalize this activity. 100
Siegel identifies several potential state interests: “prevention of disease
and illegitimate children, the preservation of the institution of marriage and
the safeguarding of general community morals.” 101 The simple fact that
these laws are no longer enforced demonstrates that the interests are no
longer compelling. 102 Even so, Siegel goes on to demonstrate how
criminalizing adultery to prevent disease is not narrowly tailored enough to
have an effect on disease rates and is under-inclusive, since “disease does
not discriminate between extramarital sex and all other types of sex.”103
Additionally, the goal of preventing problems related to illegitimate
children is over-inclusive, since the prohibition against adultery applies
equally to those who are fertile and those were not. 104
The states’ interest in protecting the marital relationship is based on
protecting an innocent spouse, and protecting the institution of marriage
itself. 105 The lack of prosecution of adulterers negates any interest in
protecting spouses. Even if the statutes were enforced, it is difficult to
explain how imposing a criminal sentence on an adulterer will protect the
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.

See generally Siegel, supra note 81, at 76–81.
See generally id.
See generally id. See also generally Sweeny, supra note 39.
Siegel, supra note 81, at 87.
Id.
Id. at 88.
Id.
Id.
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wounded spouse. In fact, the exact opposite is likely, as criminal sanctions
and notoriety impose additional hardships on those involved. 106
The argument that adultery laws protect the institution of marriage
may have had some traction when marriage was a more permanent
institution. However, in light of the ability of spouses to terminate a
marriage for any reason, criminalizing adultery in order to prevent sexual
dalliances serves no purpose. If a couple can end the marriage and
consequently end the sexual exclusivity implied by that marriage, any
attempts to force that sexual exclusivity is fruitless.107
Finally, justification for criminalizing adultery may be based on
protecting community morals. 108 The use of morals justifications has been
found insufficient to represent a compelling state interest. In Romer v.
Evans, 109 the Supreme Court explicitly found that generalized community
animus was not only insufficient as a compelling interest, but it did not
even qualify as a legitimate state interest. 110 Morals-based legislation is
unsustainable, 111 so asserting the protection of community morals as a
reason to infringe upon a fundamental right is untenable.
2. Justifications for Fornication and Cohabitation Restrictions Are no
Longer Valid
Similar justifications have been suggested as support for legislation
criminalizing fornication and cohabitation. 112 Just as attempting to prohibit
extramarital sex will not prevent the spread of disease, since disease does
not discriminate between marital sex and non-marital sex, this justification
for prohibiting fornication and cohabitation also fails. The availability of
birth control, paternity testing, and acceptance of single parenthood leaves
the idea of protecting illegitimate children standing high and dry. And,
given the fact that marriage is no longer a permanent institution, prohibiting
non-marital sex offers no protection of that institution. Finally, suggesting
106. Siegel, supra note 81, at 90.
107. Id. at 90–91.
108. Id. at 92.
109. 517 U.S. 620 (1996).
110. Id. at 632.
111. Linda Anderson, Legislative Oppression: Restricting Gestational Surrogacy to
Married Couples is an Attempt to Legislate Morality, 42 U. BALT. L. REV. 611, 649
(Summer 2013).
112. See generally Sweeny, supra note 39, at 170.
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that fornication and cohabitation violates societal mores may not be
supported by the statistics about the number of people who engage in these
behaviors. Additionally, these justifications are no longer viable in light of
the Supreme Court’s assertion that “the fact that the governing majority in a
state has traditionally viewed a particular practice as immoral is not a
sufficient reason for upholding a law prohibiting the practice.” 113
Despite the potential arguments that criminal statutes prohibiting
cohabitation, fornication, and adultery are unconstitutional, the lack of
prosecution of these crimes means they are unable to be challenged. This
lack of prosecution acts as evidence that could eliminate the statutes, and it
also acts as a method of preserving the statutes because no one can
demonstrate standing to mount a challenge. 114
IV. BDSM Activity
Though the likelihood of being criminally prosecuted for cohabiting,
fornicating, or engaging in adultery is remote, that is not the case for
another alternative sexual behavior—BDSM. 115 Though millions of people
engage in BDSM activities, those who do not often consider the practice
perverted or deviant. Until 2010, those who practiced BDSM were
considered mentally ill. 116 The fact that some practitioners have been
criminally prosecuted adds fuel to the fire and increases the stigma
associated with these activities. 117

113. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 577–78 (2003).
114. See Sweeny, supra note 39, at 170–71 (discussing how fornication and adultery
statutes remain on the books despite lack of prosecution as a way for the legislature to
disapprove of these acts).
115. BDSM generally refers to bondage, discipline, dominance, submission and
sadomasochism.
116. Merissa Nathan Gerson, BDSM Versus the DSM: A History of the Fight that got
Kink Declassified as Mental Illness, THE ATLANTIC, (Jan. 13, 2015),
http://www.theatlantic.com/health/archive/2015/01/bdsm-versus-the-dsm/384138/
(last
visited Apr. 14, 2016) (discussing that prior to 2010 BDSM could be used against a person
in family court because of the classification in the DSM) (on file with the Washington and
Lee Journal of Civil Rights and Social Justice).
117. See Kaplan, supra note 67, at 115–17 (describing the effect that criminalization of
BDSM behavior has on the BDSM community).
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A. A BDSM Primer
Before addressing the problems associated with criminal restrictions
on BDSM activities, it is important to be clear about exactly what these
activities entail. First, and foremost, BDSM involves consensual erotic or
sexual activity. 118 Typically there is some form of power exchange, where
one party consents to the other having the power to control him or her. This
may involve psychological control, such as domination or humiliation. It
may also involve consenting to be bound or restrained in some manner, or
to be subjected to some form of corporal punishment. 119 In some BDSM
situations the parties agree that one may inflict pain upon the other. When
this is part of the BDSM dynamic the pain is experienced as a desirable and
pleasurable sensation. 120 If the participants consent to the infliction of pain
it is always because the person experiencing the pain has requested this.
That person retains the complete power to cause the pain to be ceased
immediately, even though consent to inflict such pain was freely given. 121
One of the hallmarks of the BDSM community is the emphasis on
safe, sane, and consensual behavior. 122 Because practitioners understand
that they are engaging in behaviors, and using implements that have the
potential to cause harm, the focus on safety ensures that the risk of harm is

118. Id. at 116.
119. See id. at 116 (“BDSM encompasses a range of sexual activities between
consenting adults that includes bondage, domination and submission, and sadomasochistic
activity.”).
120. Id. at 117. The National Coalition for Sexual Freedom, an advocacy group for
consenting adults in the BDSM-Leather-Fetish, Swing, and Polyamory Communities,
explains sadomasochism, the SM aspects of BDSM, as
a sexual orientation or behavior among two or more adult partners. The behavior
may include, but is not limited to, the use of physical and/or psychological
stimulation to produce sexual arousal and satisfaction. Usually one partner will
take an active role (top or dominant) and the other will take a passive role
(bottom or submissive). SM practitioners can be heterosexual, bisexual,
homosexual, transgendered or intersex individuals.
What is SM? Introduction, National Coalition for Sexual Freedom (hereinafter NCSF),
https://ncsfreedom.org/key-programs/education-outreach/what-is-sm/item/381-what-is-sm?sm-is-sexual-orientation-or-behavior.html (last visited Apr. 14, 2016) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Journal of Civil Rights and Social Justice).
121. See Kaplan, supra note 67, at 117 (discussing the safe word as a way for a person
in a BDSM relationship to withdraw consent).
122. Monica Pa, Beyond the Pleasure Principle: The Criminalization of Consensual
Sadomasochistic Sex, 11 TEX. J. WOMEN & L. 51, 61 (2001); NCSF, supra note 120; Kaplan,
supra note 67, at 117.
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monitored and minimized. 123 The reference to sane behavior reflects the
recognition that, without consent the activities would cause emotional harm
rather than physical pleasure. This principle also helps dispel the idea that
people who engage in BDSM activities are suffering from a mental
disorder. 124 Like many other forms of sexual activity that had been
considered psychological disorders, engaging in BDSM activity does not
rise to the level of a psychological disorder unless it interferes with a
person’s everyday life. 125 Though individuals may experience “intense
sexual arousal from the act of being humiliated, beaten, bound, or otherwise
made to suffer” 126 or “intense sexual arousal from the physical or
psychological suffering of another person,” 127 neither of these behaviors
rises to the level of a disorder unless the person also suffers psychosocial
difficulties as the result of the behavior, or engages in this behavior with a
non-consenting individual. 128
And finally, BDSM is consensual. Unlike many other erotic or sexual
interactions where those involved simply fumble through the interactions
without knowing exactly where the boundaries will appear, the practice of
BDSM involves explicit consent to clearly negotiated parameters.
“‘Consent’ is considered the ‘first law’ of S/M sex—the moral dividing line
between S/M and brutality. Consent is required to be voluntary, knowing,
explicit, and with full understanding of previously agreed to parameters.
The ongoing consent of the participants is required, and constructive
consent is never sufficient.” 129 Limits are defined. Expectations are
explained. And most importantly, methods of communicating when consent
is being withdrawn are spelled out clearly. 130 Often, this negotiation
involves creating a “safe word” that conveys to the other party the need to
stop, immediately. Safe words are necessary because, at times BDSM
scenes involve the use of physical force, restraint, or threat of harm despite
123. See Kaplan, supra note 67, at 117 (describing the dominant person in a BDSM as
monitoring the safety of the submissive so as to ensure there is not too much physical harm).
124. See id. at 117–18 (describing that part of the reason the BDSM community selfdescribes as “sane” is to dispel the stigma that BDSM is only practiced by people who are
mentally unwell).
125. AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC ASSOCIATION, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF
MENTAL DISORDERS (hereinafter DSM-5) 694–97 (2013).
126. Id. at 694.
127. Id. at 695.
128. Id. at 694–97.
129. Pa, supra note 122, at 61.
130. See Kaplan, supra note 67, at 117 (describing the use of a safe word in BDSM
relationships).
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the objection of the person being subjected to the force, restraint or threat.
This is one situation where “no” does not usually mean no, but the use of
the safe word (something very different than no) clearly means consent has
been withdrawn or a limit has been reached.131
B. Criminal Prosecution of BDSM Activity
Unlike those who engage in the types of sexual behavior discussed
earlier, those who engage in BDSM practices have faced criminal
prosecution. 132 Most of the criminal cases have involved charges of assault,
or assault and battery. 133 (Whichever term is used, the charges usually stem
from statutes that prohibit causing, or attempting to cause bodily injury to
another.) Whether based on a lack of understanding of the sexual nature of
BDSM activities or from the similarity to non-consensual assaults, criminal
charges for these behaviors have typically been brought under traditional
assault and battery prohibitions rather than sex assault statutes. The focus
has been on the violent aspect of the interaction, rather than the sexual
aspect. 134 By choosing to proceed under traditional assault and battery
statutes prosecutors remove any possibility of consent being introduced as a
potential defense to the allegations underlying the charge. 135
Courts have been reluctant to believe that individuals might actually
choose to submit to the types of activities that are common BDSM
practices. In People v. Samuels, the California Court of Appeal refused to
allow a defendant to assert consent as a defense to charges of aggravated
131. Id.
132. See Pa, supra note 122, at 64–71 (describing the various criminal cases that have
been reported in the United States and England).
133. See id (describing that participants in S/M relationships have been prosecuted for
criminal assault).
134. See id. at 79 (“The consensual agreement of the parties’ (sic) is overridden by
judicial and academic readings of S/M sex as uncivilized or undignified violence.”).
135. See People v. Samuels, 250 Cal. App. 2d 501, 513 (Cal. Ct. App. 1967) (holding
consent is available as a defense to assault or battery only in the context of sports like
football, boxing or wrestling); Govan v. State, 913 N.E. 2d 237, 242 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009)
(holding that even when there are sexual overtones, consent is not available as a defense if a
deadly weapon is involved); State v. Collier, 372 N.W.2d 303, 307 (Iowa Ct. App. 1985)
(refusing to include the possibility of consent to S/M activity as a “sport, social or other
activity” which would allow a consent defense); Commonwealth v. Carey, 974 N.E. 2d 624,
631 (Mass. 2012) (refusing to extend Lawrence ruling regarding consensual sexual relations
to situation where a person “might be injured [or coerced]”); People v. Jovanovic, 700
N.Y.S. 2d 156, 169 n.5 (N.Y. App. Div. 1999) (stating consent unavailable as a defense for
assault that “causes injury or carries a risk of serious harm”).
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assault. 136 Even though the charges were based on a report related to the
processing of film that depicted the defendant within another man, and were
not based on a complaint by the recipient of the whipping, the court was
unwilling to consider the consensual nature of the interaction even though
the volunteer only suffered red marks and bruising. 137 The court appeared to
believe the volunteer was somehow mentally impaired or otherwise not
normal, as it reasoned that “[it] is a matter of common knowledge that a
normal person in full possession of his faculties does not freely consent to
the use, upon himself, of force likely to produce great bodily injury.” 138
In a recent case where the alleged victim testified that she “asked [the]
defendant to inflict the bruising and wanted him to do so,” urging him to
continue despite his reluctance, the California Court of Appeal still refused
to consider the potential consent to negate the crime of assault.139 The court
acknowledged that consent was a defense to charges of rape, kidnapping,
sexual battery and burglary and in those instances the lack of consent is an
element of the crime itself. 140 But, lack of consent is not an element of
charges of “torture, infliction of corporal injury on a cohabitant, and
criminal threats.” 141 Furthermore, the court noted that courts throughout the
country have refused to allow consent as a defense when there is serious
bodily injury, even if it is the result of consensual sadomasochistic
activity. 142
Prosecutors and courts alike continue to prosecute nonconsensual
BDSM as a criminal assault rather than a form of sexual assault, even when
there are sexual overtones to the activity. 143 In Golden v. State, a defendant
was convicted of battery for branding his girlfriend and whipping her with a
cord because, despite the sexual/BDSM nature of the actions, a deadly
weapon was involved. 144

136. Samuels, 250 Cal. App. 2d at 513.
137. Id.
138. Id. at 513–14.
139. People v. Davidson, No. D064880, 2015 WL 4751166, at *7 (Cal. Ct. App. Aug.
12, 2015) (unreported).
140. Id.
141. Id.
142. Id.
143. See Golden v. State, 913 N.E. 2d 237, 242 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009) (describing that it
is against public policy to allow consent to negate battery when there are sexual overtones
and a deadly weapon is used).
144. Id.
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Regardless of the fact that BDSM practitioners seek and take actions
that result in injury (though usually not serious bodily injury), and may
need to feel coerced into certain situations or actions, courts refuse to
include this within the realm of protected consensual sexual activity. In
Commonwealth v. Carey, 145 the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court
determined that consent is immaterial when the activity involves the
potential for bodily harm. 146 Here the court acknowledged that, in light of
the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Lawrence, individuals had a right to
engage in private consensual sexual behavior, but noted that Lawrence
limited that right to situations where there was no threat of bodily harm, so
prosecution of consensual sexual activity when bodily harm was involved
was possible. 147
The use of criminal assault statutes that prevent a defendant from
claiming a defense based on consent changes the view of transgressions in
BDSM practices from transgressions beyond an agreed-upon boundary to
physical attacks for hostile purposes. To do so is to misunderstand the
entire nature of a BDSM relationship. Additionally, the fact that courts
view temporary “injuries” such as pain caused by a clamp placed on the
skin or by hot wax being dropped onto the skin, or the pain associated with
being spanked by wooden spoon, as serious bodily injury belies the fact that
there is more at play than protecting the public interest and preventing
citizens from serious harm. 148
According to the Model Penal Code, “serious bodily injury” means
“injury which creates a substantial risk of death or which causes serious,
permanent disfigurement, or protracted loss of impairment of the function
of any bodily member or organ.” 149 Though there are certainly instances
where BDSM transgressions can result in serious bodily injury, choosing to
include all BDSM activities within this definition goes too far.

145. 974 N.E.2d 624 (Mass. 2012).
146. See id. at 631–32 (noting that a right to sexual privacy is outweighed by the state’s
interest in protecting people from violence).
147. Id. at 631.
148. Pa, supra note 122, at 72.
149. MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.0(3) (2014).
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V. Plural Marriages
A. Polygamy

A discussion of alternative relationship forms would not be complete
without at least a brief discussion of polygamy. Like cohabitation,
fornication, and adultery, polygamy is specifically prohibited by law
through the criminal prohibition of bigamy. 150 Most Americans picture only
one form of polygamy when considering this arrangement. The historical
conflict between the Mormon church and the United States, in connection
with the state of Utah’s admission to the United States, focuses American
views on a form of polygamy that involves one husband and multiple
wives. 151 This form of polygamy is known as polygyny. The converse is
polyandry—one wife with multiple husbands. 152 In the United States, it is
estimated that between thirty thousand and one hundred thousand people
practice polygamy, in the form of polygyny. 153 Professor Adrienne Davis
provides a clear overview of the issues related to the typical picture of
polygamy. Professor Davis outlines the arguments for and against these
arrangements 154 and then describes issues that would arise if states were to
decriminalize and regulate plural marriages.155 To address the issues she
identifies if states were to regulate plural marriage, Davis suggests rules
addressing the formation, expansion, and dissolution of such marriages be
governed by rules similar to those found in partnerships. 156

150. See, e.g., MONT. CODE ANN. §45-5-611 (establishing a fine and imprisonment for
the offense of bigamy); OR. REV. STAT. ANN. §163.515 (classifying the crime of bigamy as a
Class C felony).
151. See Plural Marriages and Families in Early Utah, LDS.ORG,
https://www.lds.org/topics/plural-marriage-and-families-in-early-utah?lang=eng (last visited
Apr. 14, 2016) (describing the existence of plural marriages through the church in the late
1800s and early 1900s) (on file with the Washington & Lee Journal of Civil Rights and
Social Justice).
152. Davis, supra note 30, at 1965; Den Otter, Three May Not be a Crowd: The Case
for a Constitutional Right to Plural Marriage, 64 EMORY L.J. 1977, 1983 (2015).
153. See Cassiah M. Ward, Note, I Now Pronounce You Husband and Wives: Lawrence
v. Texas and the Practice of Polygamy in Modern America, 11 WM & MARY J. WOMEN & L.
131, 132 (2004) (“Experts estimate that more than thirty thousand—and as many at one
hundred thousand—Fundamentalist Mormons currently practice polygamy in Utah, Arizona,
Canada, and Mexico.”). See also generally Davis, supra note 30, at 1968.
154. See generally Davis, supra note 30, at 169–79.
155. See generally id. at 1989–98.
156. See generally id. at 2001–25.
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While Davis’ ideas about the ways to handle plural marriages seem
logical, they continue to focus primarily on plural marriages involving one
husband and multiple wives. The suggestion implied by this focus is that
the intimate connections flow between the husband and each of the wives
separately. But this picture leaves out a potential form of plural marriage
altogether—a form where intimate connections are created between all
members of the marriage. Sometimes coined “group marriage,” 157 those
who practice this form of polygamy (though without the legal recognition
of marriage) often refer to the arrangement as polyamory or polyfidelity. 158
B. Polyamory
Polyamorous arrangements “vary as to the number of people involved,
the sexes of those involved, the sexualities of those involved, the level of
commitment of those involved, and the kinds of relationships pursued.” 159
These arrangements reflect the variety of social practices that are becoming
more evident and accepted in today’s society. Polyamorous relationships
may appear similar to traditional polygyny or polyandry, or they might
include homosexual and bisexual individuals and their respective
relationships as well. 160 In addition, the range of relationship forms is
enormous, running the gamut from an “individual who has multiple,
concurrent but discrete dyadic relationships with others” 161 to a “triad,
consisting of two or three dyadic relationships, depending on whether each
of the three is sexually involved with the other two or whether only one of
the three is sexually involved with the other two.” 162 The nature of the
relationships may vary as well. Some look like traditional marriage
relationships with long-term commitments, while others may be sporadic
short-term relationships that are more like dating relationships than longterm commitments. 163
157. See Den Otter, supra note 152, at 1983 (defining group marriage as between any
combination of men and women).
158. See Strassberg, supra note 36, at 439 (discussing the coining of the terms
polyamory and polyfidelity).
159. Id. at 440.
160. See id. at 441 (discussing the ways in which polyamory differs from traditional
polygamous relationships).
161. Id. at 444.
162. Id. at 444.
163. See id. at 445 (discussing the variation of commitment between partners in
polyamorous relationships).
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Though plural marriages and polyamorous relationships are
alternatives worth considering, the complications that would arise for these
relationships to be recognized and regulated are complicated enough that it
is likely to be some time before such recognition occurs, if it does.
However, the growing visibility and social acceptance of alternative
intimate arrangements adds support to the idea that the time has come to
eliminate criminal sanctions for intimate behaviors, and provide ways to
protect those who wish to explore such arrangements.
VI. Efforts to Legislate Morality
Some decisions that we make are so personal that government
interference makes no sense. Humans have basic needs, individual desires,
and individual beliefs that cannot be altered by courts, legislators,
executives, or any other bodies that may attempt to impose other beliefs on
all. Basic human needs, desires, and individual beliefs are so personal that
government interference of any type will never be satisfactory.
The United States was founded on principles of liberty164 and of
freedom from oppression and governmental interference. 165 Originally, our
founding fathers were concerned about religious persecution. They
ventured across the Atlantic in search of a place where they were free to
follow their own religion rather than being forced to follow the edicts of the
king. Yet today, citizens of the United States are subjected to the same sort
of restrictions on liberty that caused our forefathers to flee their homeland.
Over time, government interference in our personal lives grew. Legislators
attempted to influence personal behaviors. Gift tax laws influence the way
assets are transferred. 166 More recently, laws requiring medical providers to
honor living wills and medical directives caused people to consider how
they wished to be treated in certain critical situations.167
Yet all of these legislative schemes were, and are, optional. They all
involve personal decisions, yet none of them force a particular decision
upon the individual. One who wishes to behave differently than the
legislation encourages is still free to make that choice and accept the
consequences for doing so.
164. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776).
165. THE FEDERALIST NO. 51 (James Madison).
166. DAVID JOULFAIAN, U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREAS., THE FEDERAL GIFT TAX: HISTORY,
LAW, AND ECONOMICS, OTA PAPER 100, 25 (Nov. 2007).
167. See, e.g. generally, FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 765.301–765.309.
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A. Early Legislation Targeted Morality
Even though our forefathers were attempting to avoid the imposition
of a specific religion or belief system, they still chose to control behaviors
that were considered amoral. Criminal statutes prohibited harming others.
The balance between individual liberty and protecting members of society
required some personal restrictions, as it still does today.
In his book On Liberty, John Stuart Mill differentiated between actions
that caused harm to others, and actions that only affected one’s self. 168
Looking specifically at morals legislation, he approved of legislation that
prevented an individual’s choice to engage in behavior that would harm
another who had not agreed to that harm. 169 Even so, early legislation
banned personal behaviors that did not affect others. Statutes controlling
decorum, and banning certain activities were enacted to prevent individuals
from debasing themselves and somehow debasing society as a result. As
described earlier in this Article, some of these restrictions affected
decisions about intimate relationships. 170
At the time, some of those restrictions made sense, because the
behaviors they restricted may have caused consequences to others. For
instance, fornication statutes, restricting intercourse between unmarried
individuals, provided protection for women from becoming pregnant and
having to support a child alone. When most women did not work outside
the home, this may have been a reasonable restriction, or at least a
defensible one. Arguably, adultery statutes served a similar purpose.
So, despite a strong belief in personal liberty, early legislators enacted
laws designed to control individual morality. At the time, our country was
much more homogeneous than today. Most people shared common ideas
about morality. Fewer diverse opinions and diverse lifestyles existed to
challenge those societal mores. But, as our world became smaller, travel
between various areas of the country and the world became easier; living
situations, lifestyles, and families became more diverse; and we moved
from a more agrarian society to an industrial society, those social mores

168. JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY 141–44 (Walter Scott Publishing Co. 1901) (Jan.
10, 2011), https://www.gutenberg.org/files/34901/34901-h/34901-h.htm (last visited Apr.
14, 2016) (describing that once a person’s actions effect those around them then society has
jurisdiction over those actions) (on file with the Washington & Lee Journal of Civil Rights
& Social Justice).
169. Id.
170. Supra Part III.D., IV.B.
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began to blur destroying any consensus about many things our recent
ancestors took for granted.
When we look at law, whether statutory or case law, we usually
consider the circumstances at the time the law was created. This is more
explicitly considered when evaluating common law. Stare decisis requires
that we look at previous decisions made in similar circumstances. These
circumstances include the societal norms and mores at the time of the
decision. Changes in the common law arise when precedent cases are
distinguished because the situations differ enough to warrant a different
result. 171 Statutes, however, are a bit more difficult to shape and bend for
new situations. Though courts may look to legislative history to determine
how to interpret or apply a particular statute, many interpretations and
applications are difficult to change without legislative action. Until we
decide that all legislation should sunset after a specific number of years (a
topic for a different article), the only way some statutory prohibitions lose
their effect is through prosecutorial discretion about whether to enforce the
particular statute by pursuing criminal charges.
B. Restrictions on Legislating Morality
Legislation based solely on concepts of morality is unconstitutional. 172
Recent Supreme Court decisions regarding legislation related to individual
personal behaviors have made it clear that the imposition of one idea about
morality cannot be the reason for restricting personal decisions for all. 173
The connection between societal views of morality and the law has
long been assumed. 174 Though legislation often reflects society’s views of
171. See Mich. v. Bay Mills Indian Cmty., 134 S. Ct 20124, 20136 (2014) (explaining
stare decisis is foundational to the rule of law); POM Wonderful, LLC v. Coca Cola, Co.,
134 S. Ct. 2228, 2236 (2014) (describing the need to use canons of statutory construction).
172. See Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 633 (1996) (“By requiring that the
classification bear a rational relationship to an independent and legitimate legislative end, we
ensure that classifications are not drawn for the purpose of disadvantaging the group
burdened by the law.”).
173. See supra note 50 and discussion in Part II.
174. KENT GREENAWALT, CONFLICTS OF LAW AND MORALITY 161 (1987) (describing
natural law as “the longstanding position in moral and legal theory that human law is in
some sense derived from moral norms that are universally valid and discoverable by
reasoning about human nature or true human goods”); William N. Eskridge, Jr., Dynamic
Statutory Interpretation, 135 U. PA. L. REV. 1479, 1487 (1987) (arguing that courts interpret
statutes in light of existing social norms rather than societal norms existing at the time of
enactment); Stanley Mosk, The Common Law and the Judicial Decision-Making Process, 11
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morality, the reverse is not true; not all decisions related to appropriate
moral behavior or enforcement of morality are appropriate to be
incorporated into the law. 175 The distinction is usually based on the
differences between enforcement of public morals and enforcement of
private morals, where public morals involve actions that have a negative
effect on others, and private morals are those that involve actions that are
individual in nature, often related to sexual behavior. 176
In his series of lectures at Stanford University, noted legal philosopher
H.L.A. Hart distinguished between morality that protects against harm to
others and sexual morality, stating that “society could not exist without a
morality which mirrored and supplemented the law’s proscriptions of
conduct injurious to others. But there is . . . no evidence to support, and
much to refute, the theory that those who deviate from conventional sexual
morality are in other ways hostile to society.” 177
Morality, both private and public, describes what one ought to do, and
is grounded in religious teachings. 178 But there is no bright line. It is
possible to have conflicting views about what constitutes proper
behavior. 179 In fact, debate continues about what morality requires about all
HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 35, 36 (1988) (describing the evolution of the common law and its
ability to reflect societal changes). This assumption is evident by the assertion of
connections between morality and law without the need for citation, even by Justice Scalia.
See generally City of Erie v. Pap’s A.M., 529 U.S. 277, 310 (2000) (Scalia, J., concurring);
Romer, 517 U.S. 620, 644–48 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting); Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc.,
501 U.S. 560, 580 (1991) (Scalia, J., concurring).
175. Larry Alexander & Frederick Schauer, Law’s Limited Domain Confronts
Morality’s Universal Empire, 48 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1579, 1585–86 (2007). See also
Suzanne B. Goldberg, Morals-Based Justifications for Lawmaking: Before and After
Lawrence v. Texas, 88 MINN. L. REV. 1233, 1300–04 (2004) (discussing the influence of
morality on the law after Lawrence’s disavowal of morality as a legitimate basis for
legislation); Gregory Kalscheur, Moral Limits on Morals Legislation: Lessons for U.S.
Constitutional Law from the Declaration on Religious Freedom, 16 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J.
1, 30 (2006) (distinguishing public morality from private morality and suggesting that
“public good,” rather than morality in general, is the appropriate role of legislation).
176. See, e.g., G. Marcus Cole, What Is the Government’s Role in Promoting
Morals? . . . Seriously?, 31 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 77, 79 (2008) (using the terms morality
of aspiration and morality of duty, where morality of duty involves the “basic duty to respect
the person and property of others”). See also generally Timothy W. Reinig, Comment, Sin,
Stigma & Society: A Critique of Morality and Values in Democratic Law and Policy, 38
BUFF. L. REV. 859, 880 (1990).
177. H.L.A. HART, LAW, LIBERTY AND MORALITY 50–51 (1963).
178. See Cole, supra note 176, at 78 (describing how morality was a province of the
church until King Henry VIII incorporated it into the state).
179. See Alexander & Schauer, supra note 175, at 1583 (“[I]f people generally agreed
about what morality required, there would then not be much reason to substitute law for the
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sorts of things, which provides the ultimate rationale for law and the legal
system—to settle disputes about what morality requires in specific
instances. 180
Additionally, the proper role of the government in promoting or
enforcing morals is subject to much debate. 181 Generally, there is agreement
that moral standards concerning harm to others or others’ property are
legitimate reasons for the government to get involved in enforcement
through legislation. 182 Laws relating to murder, assault, robbery, and
trespass fall into this category. 183
The more difficult questions involve morality that might be described
as virtues and whether these are proper subjects for legislation. 184 Until the
time of King Henry VIII, who took control of the Church of England in the
16th century, 185 morality related to virtues was the domain of the
ecclesiastical courts. 186 Today, in a system that imposes regulations on
individuals with vastly different belief systems, continuing to use
legislation to impose certain moral imperatives may impinge on others’
freedom to hold alternative beliefs about morality.
While regulating public morality to protect people from harm created
by others’ choices may still be appropriate, regulating private morality—
what we each choose to do in private, whether virtuous or not—may be
significantly more complicated. In a world where we are expected to
respect everyone’s right to practice their own religion and where tolerance
of those who are different from us is expected in all realms of life,
identifying which moral imperative to enforce becomes impossible. 187

direct moral decision making of citizens and officials alike.”).
180. Id. at 1583–84.
181. See Cole, supra note 176, at 77 (discussing two theories of the role of government
and morality and how they are in conflict).
182. Id. at 79.
183. Id. at 77, 79.
184. Id. at 79.
185. King Henry VII ruled England from 1509 to 1547. During the 1530s and 1540s he
expanded royal authority at the expense of ecclesiastical authority. A.F. Pollard, Biography
of King Henry VIII of England, 13 ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA 289 (Cambridge Univ. Press
1910), http:// www.luminarium.org/renlit/tudorbio.htm (last visited Apr. 14, 2016) (on file
with the Washington & Lee Journal of Civil Rights and Social Justice).
186. Cole, supra note 176, at 81.
187. See GREENAWALT, supra note 174, at 26 (asserting that “reasons relating
exclusively to one’s own welfare do not establish what, morally, one ought to do; people are
free morally not to pursue their own welfare”).
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C. Public Morality Versus Private Morality
Some restrictions on behaviors addressed by private morals are
appropriate because the behaviors being restricted can lead to potentially
harmful effects on others.188 Restrictions on gambling, 189 or the attempt to
prohibit the use of alcohol 190 are designed to protect public morals. Each
regulates individual behavior which has a basis in both private and public
morals. 191 The restrictions on individual behavior attempt to discourage
behavior that is commonly considered lacking in virtue, but more
importantly, the restrictions protect others who may be harmed by this lack
of virtuous behavior. 192 For example, legislation to restrict gambling has
been justified by the need to protect families from the financial trouble that
often accompanies excessive gambling. 193 Another example, prohibition,
188. See HART, supra note 177, at 50–51 (stating under which conditions behavioral
restrictions based on private morals are proper).
189. See, e.g. generally, CAL. PENAL CODE § 330 (West 2012). In fact, Title 9 of the
California Penal Code is titled specifically, Of Crimes Against the Person Involving Sexual
Assault, and Crimes Against Public Decency and Good Morals, and addresses things such as
sexual offenses crimes against children, spousal abuse, obscenity, and gambling. See also
generally KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 528.010 (West 2006). The commentary to the Kentucky
statutes restricting gambling state:
The principal concept of the entire gambling chapter is to punish those who
make a business or profession of gambling rather than the player who makes the
business possible. Subsection (1), advancing gambling, and subsection (8),
profiting from gambling, define the basic proscribed gambling activities.
“Advancing gambling activity” refers to the activities of the operator of a
gambling enterprise as well as the person who sets up a game, furnishes
equipment, provides facilities for gambling or entices others to patronize
gambling activities. A “player” as defined in subsection (7), does not advance
gambling activity. “Profiting from gambling activity” is intended to reach the
entrepreneurs who receive money or other profit, other than as a player, pursuant
to an understanding or agreement to that effect.
KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 528.010 Kentucky Crime Commission/LRC Commentary 1974 (West
2006).
190. See, e.g., U.S. CONST. amend. XVIII (in effect from Jan. 16, 1919, until
ratification of the Twenty First Amendment in 1933).
191. See, e.g. generally, Ballock v. State, 20 A. 184, 186 (Md. 1890).
192. Cf. Raymond Ku, Swingers: Morality Legislation and the Limits of State Police
Power, 12 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 1, 34 (1999) (discussing restriction of harm to others as basis
for morality-based legislation in state police power context).
193. See generally Greater New Orleans Broad. Ass’n v. United States, 527 U.S. 173,
177 (1999) (acknowledging that in the past, commercial speech surrounding lotteries was
not protected by the First Amendment because the “demoralizing influence upon the people”
was a legitimate reason to restrict advertising about lotteries). This same case identifies the
governments concerns about gambling as “contribut[ing] to corruption and organized crime;

36

22 WASH. & LEE J. CIVIL RTS. & SOC. JUST. 3 (2016)

was designed to discourage and eliminate the potentially harmful behavior
that can occur when one is intoxicated. 194
1. Morality as a Legitimate Basis for Legislation
In addition, our legal system has considered morality a potentially
legitimate reason for legislation in a number of areas of society where it is
challenging to determine whether the moral imperative is personal or
public. 195 Where courts reviewed regulation based at least in part on
morality, the legislation was allowed when it used a public-private morality
combination as its justification. 196 Pure morality rationales, involving no
other possible reason for the legislation, were successful (for a time) in
Bowers v. Hardwick, 197 and were attempted but unsuccessful in Lawrence
v. Texas. 198 In these two cases, concern about the virtuousness of the
underwrit[ing] bribery, narcotics trafficking, and other illegal conduct; impos[[ing] a
regressive tax on the poor; and ‘offer[ing] a false but sometimes irresistible hope of financial
advancement.”’ Id. at 185 (quoting Brief of Respondent at 15–16, Greater New Orleans
Broad. Ass’n, 527 U.S. 173, 1999 WL 161073, at *15–16).
194. See generally Lisa Lucas, Comment, A New Approach to the Wine Wars:
Reconciling the Twenty-First Amendment with the Commerce Clause, 52 UCLA L. REV.
899, 915 (2005) (discussing movement to curb prevalence of alcohol).
195. See, e.g. generally, Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 195–96 (1986), overruled
by Lawrence v. Texas, 593 U.S. 558 (2003).
196. See Goldberg, supra note 175, at 1235–36 (discussing the influence of morality on
the law after Lawrence’s disavowal of morality as a legitimate basis for legislation).
197. Bowers, 478 U.S. at 196.
Even if the conduct at issue here is not a fundamental right, respondent asserts
that there must be a rational basis for the law and that there is none in this case
other than the presumed belief of a majority of the electorate in Georgia that
homosexual sodomy is immoral and unacceptable. This is said to be an
inadequate rationale to support the law. The law, however, is constantly based
on notions of morality, and if all laws representing essentially moral choices are
to be invalidated under the Due Process Clause, the courts will be very busy
indeed. Even respondent makes no such claim, but insists that majority
sentiments about the morality of homosexuality should be declared inadequate.
We do not agree, and are unpersuaded that the sodomy laws of some 25 States
should be invalidated on this basis.
198. Lawrence, 593 U.S. at 582–83.
This case raises a different issue than Bowers: whether, under the Equal
Protection Clause, moral disapproval is a legitimate state interest to justify by
itself a statute that bans homosexual sodomy, but not heterosexual sodomy. It is
not. Moral disapproval of this group, like a bare desire to harm the group, is an
interest that is insufficient to satisfy rational basis review under the Equal
Protection Clause. Indeed, we have never held that moral disapproval, without
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behavior was the sole reason provided for legislatively restricting behavior
that had no effect beyond the participating individuals. 199 In other cases,
morals rationales have been combined with interests related to obvious
means of reducing harm or increasing benefits. 200 This combination of
morality with other reasons has been described as composite morals-based
justifications. 201 Other cases suggest a basis in morality, yet never actually
discuss the moral implications. 202 These are referred to as using “embedded
morals rationale.” 203 Finally, cases that use the inert morals rationale rely
on other reasons for the actual decision, but explicitly discuss the moral
implications. 204
2. Regulation Cannot be Based on Pure Morality
Though many cases have mentioned morals as part of the rationale,
morality alone, or pure morality, has almost never been sufficient to allow
any other asserted state interest, is a sufficient rationale under the Equal
Protection Clause to justify a law that discriminates among groups of persons.
Moral disapproval of a group cannot be a legitimate governmental interest under
the Equal Protection Clause because legal classifications must not be ‘drawn for
the purpose of disadvantaging the group burdened by the law.’
(internal citations omitted).
199. See, Goldberg supra note 175, at 1244 (discussing the influence of morality on the
law after Lawrence’s disavowal of morality as a legitimate basis for legislation).
200. Id. at 1245.
201. Id.
202. See id. at 1244 (identifying cases that restrict adult entertainment, obscenity, and
foul language).
203. Id. One example of “embedded morals rationale” that Goldberg cites is City of
Erie v. Pap’s A.M., 529 U.S. 277 (2000). Pap’s A.M. relied on the city’s interest in
combating the secondary effects of nude dancing to find the regulation content-neutral and
therefore subject to the standard applied to restrictions on symbolic speech rather than the
higher standard applied to content-based restrictions. 529 U.S. at 295–96. The closest the
Court came to mentioning morals as a rationale for the regulation appeared when Justice
O’Connor stated that “‘few of us would march our sons and daughters off to war to preserve
the citizen’s right to see’ specified anatomical areas exhibited at establishments like [the
nude dance club].” 529 U.S. at 294 (quoting Justice Steven’s opinion in Young v. American
Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50, 70 (1976) (plurality opinion)).
204. See Goldberg, supra note 175, at 1246 (citing Penn. Cent. Transp. Co. v. N.Y.C.,
438 U.S. 104 (1978), as an example). In this case the Court mentioned that land-use
regulations are generally upheld when “‘the health, safety, morals, or general welfare’ would
be promoted by prohibiting particular contemplated uses of land” yet the decision rested on
other reasons. Penn Cent. Transp. Co., 438 U.S. at 125 (quoting Nectow v. Cambridge, 277
U.S. 183, 188 (1928)).
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regulation. 205 Instead, the Supreme Court has increasingly emphasized
“observable societal harms.” 206 Vice alone, without damage to others, has
not been the subject of legitimate regulation. 207
One of the reasons it is so difficult to use morality to enforce virtue—
those personal decisions that do not result in societal harm—is that virtue
and the associated benefits that spring from a virtuous life require the
freedom to choose without coercion. 208 Even the Catholic Church, one of
the institutions from which moral responsibilities spring, recognizes that
religious freedom requires that each person is treated with dignity, which is
protected by the Constitution that governs society, regardless of their
choices about morality. 209 And the associated decision-making that is
afforded to those who are entitled to exercise their own judgment requires
that “no one is forced to act in a manner contrary to their own beliefs, . . .
no one is to be restrained from acting in accordance with their own beliefs”
and that “the dignity of the human person in no way depends on whether or
not the person’s beliefs or actions are in accord with religious or moral
truth.” 210
Legislation that codifies a commonly accepted duty to others may also
be considered regulation of public morality. For instance, statutes that
establish compulsory education impose a duty on parents to insure that their
children receive at least a minimal level of education.211 Generally
205. See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 577 (2003) (quoting Bowers v. Hardwick,
478 U.S. 186, 216 (1986) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“[T] he fact that the governing majority
in a State has traditionally viewed a particular practice as immoral is not a sufficient reason
for upholding a law prohibiting the practice.”)).
206. Goldberg, supra note 175, at 1259.
207. See id. at 1260 (citing Professor Christopher Tiedeman’s objection to the use of
police power solely to “banish vice and sin from the world”).
208. See Cole, supra note 176, at 84 (discussing the difficulties of using morality to
enforce virtue); see also Kalscheur, supra note 175, at 9 (analyzing enforcing virtue).
209. See Kalscheur, supra note 175, at 8–9.
210. Id. at 9.
211. See, e.g., MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 380.1561 (West Supp. 2012).
Except as otherwise provided in this section, for a child who turned age 11
before December 1, 2009 or who entered grade 6 before 2009, the child’s parent,
guardian, or other person in this state having control and charge of the child
shall send that child to a public school during the entire school year from the age
of 6 to the child’s sixteenth birthday. Except as otherwise provided in this
section, for a child who turns age 11 on or after December 1, 2009 or a child
who was age 11 before that date and enters grade 6 in 2009 or later, the child’s
parent, guardian, or other person in this state having control and charge of the
child shall send the child to a public school during the entire school year from
the age of 6 to the child’s eighteenth birthday.
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considered a moral obligation as part of parenthood, all fifty states and the
District of Columbia address compulsory education through legislation, and
many include criminal penalties for failure to comply. 212
Other parental obligations are also commonly accepted and considered
some sort of natural duty as well. Child support legislation requires parents
to provide financial support for their children, a parental duty so widely
held that federal statutes exist to enforce this obligation.213 Yet these
statutorily enforced duties may also be classified as morally imposed
obligations on individual behavior. 214
VII. Consent as the Controlling Factor
Morality is generally based on commonly accepted ideals of
appropriate human conduct. Yet the ideas regarding the appropriateness of
premarital sex, cohabitation, or extra-marital affairs are no longer consistent
with the criminal statutes originally enacted to encourage moral behavior.
Permanent monogamy is no longer the expected norm. Approximately forty
percent of American marriages end in divorce and seventy percent of those
who divorce move on to a second marriage. 215 Consequently, we end up
with serial monogamy.
As described earlier in this Article, a series of cases decided on the
basis of individual rights to privacy, have eliminated the right to legislate
certain very personal decisions. Most of these decisions have involved
212. See 50 STATE STATUTORY SURVEYS, Compulsory Education, 0040 SURVEYS 6
(Westlaw 2007). A Colorado statue also imposes a legal obligation on parents in the
following provision:
The general assembly hereby declares that two of the most important factors in
ensuring a child’s educational development are parental involvement and
parental responsibility. The general assembly further declares that it is the
obligation of every parent to ensure that every child under such parent’s care
and supervision receives adequate education and training. Therefore, every
parent of a child who has attained the age of six years on or before August 1 of
each year and is under the age of seventeen years shall ensure that such child
attends the public school in which such child is enrolled in compliance with this
section.
COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 22-33-104(5)(a) (West 2011).
213. See, e.g., Child Support and Recovery Act of 1992, 18 U.S.C. § 228 (2012)
(establishing enforcement mechanism for collecting outstanding child support across state
boundaries).
214. See State Dep’t of Revenue v. Hubbard, 720 P.2d 1177, 1179 (Mont. 1986)
(“Child support is a social and moral obligation imposed by law without court action.”).
215. Emens, supra note 9, at 298.
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personal life choices: who or whether to marry, whether to use birth control,
who to live with, and what types of sexual behaviors to enjoy. The two
most recent cases in this line of privacy rights decisions, Lawrence and
Obergefell, leave no room for quibbling about the fact that the decision
about who to be sexually intimate with, and who to marry, are not within
the purview of the government to restrict.
As the Supreme Court has started to tell states and the federal
government to stay out of our personal, intimate decisions, legislators and
lobbyists are waging a related battle. In response to society’s acceptance of
much more sexual freedom, women, especially young, college-age women,
are becoming much more vocal about the way they engage in sexual
relations. The sexual revolution of this generation has not condoned, and
probably never will condone one party engaging in non-consensual sexual
behavior with another. Recent efforts by women’s groups, especially on
college campuses, have put the idea of consent front and center.
Additionally, legislation prohibiting sexual harassment, sexual assault,
domestic violence, dating violence, and stalking has been invigorated. Title
IX now requires a much more proactive response by organizations where
the potential for these types of behavior is most prevalent. Young adults are
learning how important it is to have full consent before engaging in sexual
interactions. 216 The National Center for Sexual Freedom (NCSF), a national
advocacy group, has initiated a project called Consent Counts. Its purpose
is to “decriminalize consensual BDSM (Bondage, Discipline,
Dominance/Submission, Sadomasochism) in U.S. law by ensuring that
consent will be recognized as a defense to criminal charges brought under
assault laws and other statutes.” 217
At the same time, the American Law Institute (ALI) is revising
sections of the Model Penal Code that relate to sex-based crimes. 218 Though
the ALI has not yet completed the revisions to the sex offenses section of
the Model Penal Code, so far, they have not addressed an important part of
the criminalization of sexual intimacy.
216. See Jeanne Zaino, Changing Definitions of Sexual Consent on College Campuses,
Inside Higher Ed, University of Venus Blog, (July 21, 2015), https://www.insidehighered.
com/blogs/university-venus/changing-definitions-sexual-consent-college-campuses
(last
visited Apr. 14, 2016) (discussing young people’s knowledge of consent as it relates to
sexual interactions) (on file with the Washington & Lee Journal of Civil Rights & Social
Justice).
217. NCSF, Consent Counts Mission Statement, https://ncsfreedom.org/who-weare/about-ncsf/item/550.html (last visited Apr. 26, 2016) (on file with the Washington & Lee
Journal of Civil Rights & Social Justice).
218. See supra note 42 and accompanying text for discussion.
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The proposed changes to the Model Penal Code are a step in the right
direction, but while there is the opportunity to re-evaluate the way we
criminalize intimacy, it is time to look at all of the statutes that do so. What
the ALI is missing is a discussion of the ways consensual sexual behavior is
still restricted. If consent really counts, as it does in sexual assault statutes,
then let’s make it count for all consensual sexual relations.
VIII. Legislating for Today’s World—A Proposal
Regardless of whether relationships involve members of the same sex
or opposite sex, and regardless of whether those relationships are
formalized by a marriage certificate, a healthy intimate relationship has
certain characteristics. Granted, not every intimate relationship
demonstrates all of the characteristics, but it is well-recognized that these
relationships should be based on mutual respect, effective communication,
honesty, and trust. If these attributes are important to sustaining healthy,
long-lasting intimate relationships—something our society seems to
value—then legislation that encourages such behaviors should be promoted,
and legislation that inhibits such behaviors should be eliminated, unless
there is a more compelling reason for that restriction.
So, what is it that needs attention? Laws that restrict the way adults
engage in consensual sexual behavior should be eliminated. Statutes
prohibiting adultery, cohabitation, fornication, sex toy sale and use, and
consensual BDSM behaviors should be eliminated.
Modern society’s ideas about love, marriage, family and sexuality
have changed drastically in the last century. Attitudes about premarital
sexual activity, homosexuality, gender roles, parenting, contraception, and
divorce have gone through major shifts, and nothing suggests these shifts
will cease at any point in the foreseeable future. Though the statistics may
be somewhat unreliable because of the stigma and potential harm of
revealing marital transgressions, various surveys suggest that the range of
married couples that experience some form of adultery is somewhere
between twenty and seventy percent.219 In fact, one recent statistical report
suggests that fifty-seven percent of men, and fifty-four percent of women
admit infidelity in a relationship.220 The numbers are smaller when
questions focus on an affair during a marriage rather than infidelity during a
219. Emens, supra note 37, at 298.
220. Infidelity
Statistics,
STATISTICS
BRAIN
(April
8,
http://www.statisticbrain.com/infidelity-statistics/ (last visited Apr. 16, 2016).

2015),
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relationship. However, according to this set of statistics, seventy-four
percent of men and sixty-eight percent of women admit they would have an
affair if there was no chance they would get caught. 221 Clearly, attitudes
about extra-marital relationships have evolved over time.
A. Toward a More Sex-Positive Approach
One commonality among the changes in attitudes appears to be more
emphasis on “sex-positive” attitudes. This is especially pronounced in the
growing polyamorous community, but it appears to be part of the reason for
shifting attitudes concerning all intimate relationships.
“Sex-positivity” refers to recognizing the value of sexual intimacy and
encouraging individuals to embrace their sexuality. 222 The sex-positive
point of view embraces all consensual sexual activity between adults as
important to our emotional and physical health, recognizing that each
individual has unique sexual interests and needs. 223
One of the hallmarks of a sex-positive attitude is the need to become
self-aware, to identify one’s sexual needs, and to be able to communicate
those needs openly and honestly. In a traditional monogamous relationship,
whether formally recognized as marriage or not, women often respond to
the needs of their male partner with little ability to express or satisfy their
own needs, especially if these did not correspond well to their partner’s
needs. Today, people are choosing relationships that have much more
egalitarian characteristics. Women’s sexual needs and interests are just as
important as men’s interests and needs.224
Additionally, couples in traditional monogamous relationships are told
that open communication and honesty with their partner build a strong
relationship. But, when that open communication and honesty reveal
significantly differing sexual needs, marriages and committed intimate
relationships run into serious trouble.

221.
222.
223.
224.

Id.
Kaplan, supra note 67, at 91.
See id. (outlining the sex positive point of view).
Emens, supra note 9, at 325.
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B. Balancing Consent, Sex-Positivity, and Marriage
I offer a solution. We have just had the concept of marriage expanded
to include two persons of the same sex as a married couple. Another option
would provide all couples with the option to enter a marriage that would not
require sexual exclusivity, one that I refer to as an “open union.” Similar to
the idea of an open marriage, or an open relationship, this open union
relationship would be based on the idea of ethical non-monogamy. Still
restricted to two adults, the non-monogamous marriage option would allow
couples who are emotionally and financially committed to each other the
freedom to develop sexually intimate relationships with others.
To avoid one party or the other forcing a reluctant partner to agree to
open the relationship, couples would have to make the choice to enter a
traditional marriage, or to enter the non-monogamous open union at the
time they chose to commit to one another. In order to prevent one party
from engaging in emotional blackmail to coerce the other to agree to the
open union, changing from monogamous to non-monogamous would have
to be significantly more challenging than changing from non-monogamous
to monogamous. To address this concern, I propose requiring a couple to
make their choice, and, if they choose the traditional monogamous option,
be restricted from changing that without going through the typical divorce
proceeding to dissolve that relationship and potentially enter the alternative
arrangement.
The differences between the two types of marriage would be nearly
invisible to the casual observer. However, the open union would include
agreements between the parties that are not often present in today’s
marriages. Both parties would be able to develop additional intimate
relationships as long as there was full disclosure to the married partner and
the new satellite partner was aware of the open union as well. Like
traditional marriages, open unions would be restricted to two people, and
individuals would only be allowed to enter into one of these agreements at a
time.
Aside from the lack of sexual exclusivity, another major difference
between the proposed open union and traditional marriage is that it would
be for a limited duration. Couples could choose to enter these agreements
for anywhere between one and five years, with the ability to negotiate some
aspects of the agreement. Couples entering the agreement for the first time
would be limited to one year. At the end of that year they would be free to
end the union, to renegotiate aspects of it, or to reaffirm the agreement.
Should the couple choose to end the agreement they would still be able to
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enter a traditional marriage if they wished, or they could end their
commitment to each other altogether.
Though couples would be free to add terms to the open union
agreement, if they chose this option they would have to agree to a minimum
standard set of terms. The agreement would expressly allow other
relationships, would establish minimum expectations for the way the details
of those relationships were handled and the way information was
communicated between all of the parties, and would create obligations to
engage in safer sex practices to protect everyone involved. Fidelity in this
arrangement would not mean sexual exclusivity; instead it would mean
honoring the terms of the agreement. Failure to do so would be cause to
terminate the agreement and end the relationship.
C. A Potential “Default” Agreement for Open Unions
What follows is a suggested set of standard terms.
Open Union (Non-Monogamous) Relationship Agreement
The following persons, ________________ and __________________
freely enter into this relationship agreement, which will begin on
________________ and extend for a period of one year, terminating on
_________________. We are defining our relationship as an Open Union.
At the end of the term of this agreement, we may choose to reconfirm or
renegotiate our agreement. We may also choose not to continue the
relationship and to part from each other peacefully, respectfully, and as
whole and free persons.
Whereas:
This agreement is understood to apply to a single relationship
between two individuals;
This agreement does not prohibit additional unique understandings,
agreements, and limitations that may apply to the two individuals in this
Open Union throughout the course of the relationship;
This agreement is intended to be an overall agreement and
statement of expectations for the ethical and respectful treatment of both
individuals in this relationship, and to clarify the relationship as one that is
intentionally non-monogamous; and
The basis of this relationship is our mutual agreement that we are
each happier being together than not being together;
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Each of us agrees as follows:

1. We understand that this relationship is non-monogamous, which
means there is no expectation of sexual exclusivity between the two of us.
2. We agree that neither of us should be expected to hide our
relationship from others, or to hide the nature of the relationship from
others.
3. This relationship is a relationship of equals. Each of us is expected
to make our own decisions and choices.
4. We each agree to abide by safer sex practices and to take
reasonable steps to avoid risk of sexually transmitted infections or diseases.
5. This relationship is founded on honesty, and the truth must be
shared, even when it is unpleasant.
6. We agree that each will keep the other informed of important life
events, including, but not limited to:

a.
b.
c.
d.
e.
f.
g.

Addition of new partners;
Removal of other partners;
Changes in status of other partners;
Changes in work/employment situation;
Changes in health;
Changes in financial status that may affect the relationship; and
Participation in events or activities that are important or significant
with regard to one’s time or one’s emotional well-being.

B.
Because this relationship allows us each to engage in relationships
with other partners, we agree as follows:
1. To avoid sudden surprises, stay informed about each other’s lives,
and assess potential risks, we each agree to keep the other informed about
potential new partners and to provide updates as things progress or it
becomes clear they will not progress.
2. Before any potential partner becomes an actual intimate partner, we
will inform the potential partner that we are in an Open Union.
3. If a relationship with a new partner progresses, we will make an
effort to open direct lines of communication between the new partner and
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the existing partner, to allow everyone to get to know one another.
4. Both of us in this relationship will have contact information or the
other’s partner(s) with the ability to communicate freely.
5. Each of us will treat the other’s partner(s) with respect and civility.
6. Each of us will willingly share STI test results with each other and
any potential partners of the other. We agree that no unprotected sexual
relations will take place without full disclosure of all parties’ STI test
results, including the new partner’s results.
7. We agree to immediately inform each other of any suspected health
problem from a potential/new partner and to allow that information to be
disseminated to all other partners.
8. In the event of a suspected health concern, we agree to be tested
immediately.
9. It is acceptable for one of us to prefer to forego relationships with
others at any point during this relationship, but we each agree that the
choice by one of us to do so will not preclude the other from continuing to
be free to develop relationships with other partners.
Signed/witnessed/dated
IX. Conclusion
As we have seen through the legal battles surrounding same-sex
marriage, it is important to avoid creating something that is a second cousin
to marriage. In order to make this a viable choice that still encourages longterm commitments between individuals, an open union should be
considered another form of marriage, with all of the same benefits and
responsibilities, except for two. 225 There would be no expectation of sexual
exclusivity, and the agreement would need to be renewed every one to five
years, depending on whether it was the first agreement (one year) or a later
agreement where the couple negotiated a longer term (not to exceed five
years).

225. Some might argue that this negotiated arrangement should be called an open
marriage. The only reason I have chosen to avoid this term is the fact that open marriages
exist already, though they are not legally sanctioned. My goal in choosing a different name
was to avoid any of the existing ideas or perceptions of the existing open marriages from
being inadvertently attached to this new arrangement.
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In order to create an open union option, legislatures would need to be
bold enough to stand up to critics who would like to impose their morality
on the rest of society. The legislatures would have to ignore critics who
would argue that including a time-restricted, individually negotiated, nonmonogamous relationship would harm the current forms of marriage.
Instead, legislatures should focus on the benefits this option might provide.
These benefits include the ability to explore sexual interests and needs
different from a spouse. So a person who is a practitioner of BDSM could
still engage in these activities, even if that person’s spouse had no similar
interest. A person who found themselves attracted to someone else would
be able to pursue this interest and potentially enrich their life by including a
relationship with someone who shared an interest in something not shared
by their spouse. And they would do this with the full consent and
knowledge of that spouse.
Consent is a critical component of healthy intimate relationships. It’s
time for our laws to reflect the importance of consent and respect an
individual’s ability to give consent, without the law interfering.
For all those who enter these arrangements, the ability to commit to a
partner, yet not rely on that one individual to meet all of a person’s needs,
may strengthen the relationship rather than harm it. Granting the freedom to
have some physical and emotional and social needs met by someone else
relieves the pressure on the partner to whom one is committed, allowing
both parties to be more fulfilled individuals, and hopefully more sustainable
couples as well. The openness, trust, honesty and focus on clear
communication that this type of arrangement requires means it will not be
well-suited for all. But for those who value trust, honesty and openness and
effective communication in a relationship, this option will prevent the
gradual growth of deception and mistrust that often arise in traditional
marriages.
To make this happen, criminal statutes about adultery and fornication
and cohabitation must be altered or eliminated. If not completely repealed,
the adultery statutes must at least include a requirement that the extramarital relations were done without the explicit consent of the spouse.
Because after all, the most important aspect of the open union—the thing
that makes it so different—is the informed consent to extra-marital
relationships.

